This Article examines the recently decided Oil Platforms case announced by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It remarks on the internal inconsistencies and problems associated with the Court's holding. The ICJ's holding inconsistently applies the traditional "use of force" doctrine as applied in other cases decided by the Court, thereby providing evidence of other factors at work in the Court's decision. Indeed, an analysis of the holding, along with an examination of the several separate opinions, exhibits the ICJ's desire to reprimand the United States for its current actions in Iraq and its fundamental misunderstanding of the "proper" use of force. This Article also contributes to the scholarship on the developing role of the ICJ and provides commentary on international tribunals playing a quasi-political role in international affairs.
I. Introduction

2
In the fall of 2003, the ICJ 1 decided the Oil Platforms case, a highly contentious, eleven year-old case relating to the use of force, self-defense, and the permissibility of retaliation measures. In this case, the Court examined the legality of both the military actions taken by the government of Iran and the American military responses to those actions. The gravamen of Iran's complaint to the ICJ was that U.S. forces shelled two off-shore Iranian oil platforms, destroying them both on October 19, 1987, 4 and then attacked an additional offshore oil complex on April 18, 1988. ' The United States countered that Iran had been using the oil platforms as a base from which to launch missiles against American vessels legitimately sailing in international waters. 6 The Iranian complaint, filed on November 2, 1992, four years after the attacks, claimed a dispute "arising out of attack [on] and destruction of three offshore oil production complexes, owned and operated for commercial purposes by the National Iranian Oil Company... on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988, respectively." 7 The United States responded and, from 1992 to I The International Court of Justice will be referred to as "the Court" or "the ICJ" throughout this paper.
2 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S)., (Judgment of Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/iopjudgment/iop-ijudgment_20031106.PDF (last visited Oct. 27, 2004). The ICJ had already made a determination on its jurisdiction to hear the case, which is often referred to as one of the other "decisions" of the ICJ in the Oil Platforms case. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S)., 1996 I.C.J. 803 (Nov. 12) (Preliminary Objection Judgment), available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocket/ iop/iop-isummaries/iopisummary_19961212.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Preliminary Objection Judgment].
3 Oil Platforms, supra note 2. The Court's ultimate decision is highly important not only for the apparent limits it places on the doctrine of self-defense, the use of force, and the role of treaties in defusing military relations between countries, but, perhaps, even more important for the significant procedural advances the Court made in this decision. For the first time in the Court's history, the ICJ entertained the use of counterclaims by both parties in the pleadings, leading other countries, such as Yugoslavia, to file their own counterclaims in their respective unrelated ICJ litigation. 9 Now, the Court has issued "orders... on the standards by which counterclaims could proceed before the [International] Court," 1° a development that will undoubtedly change the structure and nature of litigation before the ICJ in virtually every case to come before it in the future.
Part II of this Article discusses the recent international legal scholarship regarding the U.S. invasion in Iraq, its legitimacy under international law, and how that invasion may have shaped the Court's decision. Part III discusses the events that led up to the litigation before the International Court of Justice. Part IV examines the Court's decision, including the arguments advanced by the parties and the Court's responses to those arguments. 11 Finally, Part V of this Article will argue that the ICJ's decision in Oil Platforms was an attempt by the Court to comment on the U.S. invasion in Iraq and, without the U.S. invasion, it is likely that the Court's holding would have been more favorable to the United stake in the case because it wanted compensation for the damage to its oil platforms. 
10
Id.
I I At the time this work was written, there were no articles or notes explaining the Oil Platforms decision. Therefore, this work will describe the decision in detail as part of the commentary on the case.
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States. This Article argues that the ICJ is inevitably and inescapably a politically aware institution within the international community, one that is still searching for its proper role and identity within the world community, and one that necessarily takes into account the current circumstances and recent actions of the international community when making its decisions. In the Conclusion, this Article argues that even if the Court does not make its decisions based exclusively on the historically accepted four sources of international law, 2 the existence of a Court as a semi-political actor that reacts to the actions of states on the world stage is still of considerable benefit to the international community.
II. Commentaries on the "Use of Force" and the Oil Platforms Case
Over the past century, international law regarding the use of force by states has developed significantly, with perhaps the most radical transformation engendered by the United Nations Charter. 3 As early as 1837, the United States engaged in dialogue with other nations on the proper use of force and legal selfdefensive measures under international law. 4 These dialogues played a role in articulating the requirements of "necessity" and "proportionality,"' ' now well established as two bedrock principles in determining the proper use of force by one state against another. 16 The 1945 United Nations Charter also explicitly recognized the right of self-defense, 17 but did not add much clarity or specification to the two aforementioned key principles, leaving, as one noted international law scholar remarked, "[a] degree of uncertainty or indeterminacy that inheres in the proclaimed legal limits" for self-defense. 8 Therefore, the challenge for international legal scholars, governments, and especially the ICJ, is to interpret the evidence and incidents leading to a country's use of force in a manner that reduces to the greatest extent possible this uncertainty and indeterminacy.
This challenge becomes more acute and pressing as modern methods of attacking a country beget modem methods of responding to such attacks. 9 With the advent of easier weapon delivery systems and the development of such programs as theater missile defense, the question of how to defend one's country has become paramount in recent years. In this regard, scholars particularly debate the legitimacy of the U.S. invasion of Iraq under international law. 2° Moreover, the diversity of opinion among scholars regarding the U.S. invasion of Iraq exhibits the extraordinary difficulty of coming to a clear consensus on the use of force under international law. 2 ' Indeed, in the words of one scholar, "these controversial issues indicate that the rules of selfdefense fall far short of a code of conduct that would provide precise 'hard law' for many cases likely to arise. 22 Despite this lack of a code of conduct, however, a majority of scholars have concluded that the unilateral action by the United States in Iraq, without formal authorization from the United Nations Security Council, violated customary international law and the use of force doctrine. 23 arguments lodged against this U.S. action is that "the United States government has articulated a doctrine of pre-emption whose parameters are uncertain and that is potentially very broad in scope. 24 It is against this backdrop of both the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the emerging scholarly attacks on that invasion that the ICJ decided the Oil Platforms case. While the Court did not explicitly reference the invasion or expressly base its decision on the scholarly commentary criticizing the invasion, one cannot help but conclude that these developments underlined the decision.
This Article argues that in the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ recognized that the U.S. invasion of Iraq, if it were to be considered a legitimate example of general practice accepted by law, would significantly expand the notion of the appropriate use of force under international law, especially as a matter of preemptory self-defense. To combat this expansion, the Court decided the Oil Platforms case in a manner designed to curtail this possible expansion of the use of force doctrine and to prevent other nations from taking any legal comfort in the actions of the United States. 25 Many commentators and scholars have commented on the actions of the United States in Iraq. 26 The Oil Platforms case became a tool for the ICJ to comment on the appropriate use of force doctrine in international law, to discipline the United States for its actions, and to establish with more certainty its own role in defining international law, even in relation to notions of self-defense. In the final analysis, whatever the precise doctrinal legacy of this decision, this judicial reprimand of U.S. actions in Iraq establishes the Court's institutional importance and legacy. 24 25 It is understood that the Court, much like a government entity, is not monolithic and is made up of a number of actors with a number of views. The Court did not act in complete unison when it made its decision (see infra Part V for a parsing of the different statements by the ICJ justices in the decision), and, therefore, the decision likely captures the views of several members of the Court, but not all. The views of the majority, however, are important in terms of analyzing how the ICJ deemed the U.S. actions inappropriate within the use of force context, while the separate opinions issued by several justices along with the judgment are important in explaining the thoughts and concerns of certain justices on the Court. 26 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
Of course, the Oil Platforms holding does not elucidate all aspects of the doctrine of self-defense that could profitably be developed as a matter of international law. But the Court has addressed other parts of this issue in years past, and these cases will continue to play an important role in determining the legality of certain activities. determination to do so exhibits the Court's passion to rebuke the United States. The Court's discussion, which can charitably be described only as dicta (and less charitably as detour and frolic), is best understood as an attempt to narrow the use of force doctrine in international law, thereby impeding other countries from entertaining thoughts similar to those of the United States.
III. Events Leading Up to the Conflict in the ICJ
A. General Iranian-U.S. Relations
Since the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and the hundreds of personnel within it, Iranian-U.S. relations have unquestionably been strained. 31 37 and was designed to satisfy the claims each country and their nationals had against the other. 38 Thus, up until the point that the United States attacked Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf, the two countries encountered each other on a myriad of fronts, some amicable, but more often antagonistic.
B. Events Leading to the Destruction of the Oil Platforms
The United States alleged in its pleadings that Iraqi provocations initially led to its decision to destroy three Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf. 39 According to the United States, this provocation had its origins in the eight year Iraq-Iran war. 4 " As that conflict progressed, Iranian forces began to threaten not only American interests in the Gulf, but also the oil operations of states not involved in the conflict. 4 In the face of persistent Iranian threats and attacks, the Reagan administration agreed in March of 1986 to re-register a certain number of Kuwaiti oil tankers under the U.S. flag and to provide a U.S. Navy escort in 47 On April 11, 1988, in an effort to retaliate and prevent further attacks from being launched from other oil platforms, the U.S. Navy attacked two oil platforms in the Reshadat complex. 48 Three days later, another U.S. warship struck a mine in international waters. 49 Thereafter, on April 18, 1988, combined U.S. naval forces attacked and destroyed additional Iranian offshore oil complexes. 5 " Four years after these events, and after failed diplomatic negotiations, Iran filed an application to initiate 42 See 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2597 (1987) (discussing the safety of Kuwaiti oil tankers and calling for providing protection to those tankers); see also S. REP. No. 100-102, at 2-3 (1987) (discussing the plan of a U.S. Navy escort for the reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers). proceedings within the ICJ on November 2, 1992."'
IV. The ICJ Procedure and Holding in the Oil Platforms Case
A. The Initial Filing and Jurisdictional Concerns
In its pleadings before the ICJ, Iran contended that the acts undertaken by the United States in April of 1988 constituted a "fundamental breach of the various provisions" of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (Treaty of Amity), which, it claimed, had determined the bilateral relationship between Iran and the United States since its signing in 1955.52 The application invoked the Court's jurisdiction under Article XXI, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Amity. 53 Upon notification to the United States of the application entered in the ICJ, the Court invited both parties to file a Memorial and CounterMemorial to the application within the time limits for filing. 54 The United States initially objected to the jurisdiction of the Court on the grounds that the case did not involve a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty of Amity. 55 After conducting hearings on the U.S. objection, the ICJ confirmed its jurisdiction and rejected the preliminary objection. 56 Upon receiving notice of denial of the preliminary objection, the United States filed a Counter-Memorial, which included a 
See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S). (Preliminary Objection Submitted by the United
States), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iop/ioppleadings/iop-ipleadings_199 31216_preobj-us_02.pdf (Dec. 16, 1993).
56 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, paras. 7-8. counterclaim against the government of Iran. 57 Iran, in turn, vehemently opposed the admissibility of the counterclaim filed by the United States, arguing that such claims were not permitted under the rules of the Court. 58 The ICJ, for the first time in its history, held that a counterclaim would be admissible within the proceedings and, accordingly, allowed the government of Iran to reply to the U.S. counterclaim and the United States to, in turn, submit a rejoinder. 59 
B. The Judgment of November 6, 2003
In the final analysis, the Court managed to deny the claims of both nations and enter a judgment that seemed to allow both parties to claim victory to some degree. First, the Court held that the actions of the United States against Iranian oil installations could not be justified under Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty of Amity. 63 At the same time, it also held that the U.S. attacks did 57 Id. paras. 9-10. The counterclaim alleged that Iran's actions in the Gulf during 1987-88 precipitated the retaliations by the United States and that "Iran's actions... involved mining and other attacks on U.S.-flag or U.S.-owned vessels." Id.
58 Id. paras. 10-11. Iran argued that under Art. 80 of the ICJ Statute, the counterclaim articulated by the United States did not meet the formal requirements and should not be considered by the Court. Id. The Court allowed written submissions from both parties on the admissibility of the U.S. counterclaim, allowing both sides to detail their written observations on their respective positions. Id.
59 Id. paras. 11-12; see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 9-10 (stating that "counterclaims were not major components of the cases before the P.C.I.J. [Permanent Court of International Justice] and I.C.J. up until 1997").
60 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, paras. 13-14. [Vol. 30 not constitute a violation of obligations to Iran under Article X(1) of the Treaty of Amity. 64 Commentators, and specifically the Legal Advisor for the U.S. Department of State, stated that the decision of the ICJ was consistent with U.S. arguments regarding the level of fault of the United States. 65 Iran was less pleased with the decision, as Iranian officials alleged the ICJ ruling was politically motivated and full of contradictions. 66 Indeed, Iran went so far as to deem the ruling "unjustifiable," asserting that the Court ignored the egregious actions of the United States due to political reasons. 67 Despite these comments, the Iranians welcomed the dismissal of the U.S. counterclaims. 68
The Initial Look at the Counterclaims
In its decision, the Court took the claims in reverse order, dealing first with the counterclaims of the United States against Iran. 69 There was some logic to this order, as the United States implored "the Court [to] dismiss Iran's claim and refuse it the relief it seeks because of Iran's allegedly unlawful conduct." 7 The United States based its argument on three related principles, all variations of the "clean hands" doctrine. 7 First, it argued that because Iran committed illegal armed attacks on U.S.-flagged shipping and other neutral shipping in the Gulf, Iran had acted "improperly with respect to the subject-matter of a dispute" and could not receive the relief that it sought. 72 Second, the United 64 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 99. Article X(1) of the Treaty of Amity reads: "Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation." Treaty of Amity, supra note 34, art. X(1). States contended that Iran itself violated obligations that were identical to Iran's application to the Court against the United States and, therefore, the application was not entitled to relief. 73 Finally, the United States asserted that Iran's complaints were the result of its own wrongful conduct and should be rejected because a petitioner could not receive relief when the "actions it complains of were the result of its own wrongful conduct., 7 4 In sum, the United States asked the Court to "make a finding that the United States measures against the platforms were the consequence of Iran's own unlawful uses of force." 75 The ICJ concluded that in order to make this finding it would have to investigate Iranian and U.S. actions during the period in question to rule on both the U.S. counterclaim and the Iranian claim. 76 The Court next turned to examine the jurisdictional issues present in the case between Iran and the United States.
Investigating the Jurisdictional Issues
The Court next examined the jurisdictional issues raised by both the United States and Iran, specifically whether the ICJ possessed the relevant jurisdiction to adjudicate on the interpretation or application of the Treaty. 77 
The Underlying Self-Defense Argument
The United States based much of its argument on the general doctrine of self-defense under international law, 83 arguing that its "actions were not wrongful since they were necessary and appropriate actions in self-defense." 84 The United States also highlighted that the ICJ's reaction to its defense in the proceedings was extremely important to the world community, since the Court's ruling would have serious implications for the future development of the doctrine of use of force in international law. 85 The United States and Iran differed in their interpretations of the doctrine of self-defense and the exception for essential security under Article XX(l)(d) of the Treaty. 86 In deciding this issue, the Court relied heavily on its previous ruling in Military and maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests").
80 Treaty of Amity, supra note 34, art. X(1) (stating " [b] etween the territories of the two High Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation"). 81 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 32. 82 See id. para. 35.
83 See generally DAMROSCI-I ET AL., supra note 13, at 955-73 (focusing the discussion on such topics as anticipatory self-defense, armed attacks, customary international law, necessity, nuclear weapons, proportionality, protection of nationals, terrorism, traditional law, and the U.N. Charter).
84 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 37. 
Paramilitary Activities.
In that case, the government of Nicaragua brought a claim against the United States for covert military operations in and around Nicaragua, claiming that the United States was unlawfully carrying out military operations against its government. 88 The United States countered that it was engaged in collective self-defense, and was, therefore, within its defensive rights to engage in activities to protect itself and other nations. 89 The Court rejected the U.S. claim of collective selfdefense and held that the United States had acted "in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force against another State. 9° In the Military and Paramilitary Activities case, the Court emphasized limits on the acceptable parameters of self-defense under international law, stating that an attack is deemed lawful only when in "observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence." 91 The Court stated that it would apply the same requirements of necessity and proportionality that were used in the Military and Paramilitary Activities case in its decision in the Oil Platforms case. 9 '
Reevaluating Jurisdiction Under the Self-Defense
Claim The Court in Oil Platforms considered its jurisdiction under Article XXI(2) of the Treaty of Amity to decide whatever question might arise in the application or interpretation of the U.S. defense claim utilizing its own interpretation of Article XX (1) 
C. Looking at Specifics in the Self-Defense Exception
The Court first examined the October 19, 1987 U.S. attack on the Reshadat oil complex. 98 At the time of the attack, the Reshadat complex linked twenty-seven oil wells through three drilling and production platforms, but was not producing oil due to a previous attack by the Iraqi government. 99 On October 19, 1987, four U.S. Navy destroyers approached the Reshadat complex and, after warning Iranian personnel to leave the area, shelled one of the platforms.' 0° These destroyers then began an unplanned attacked on another platform that was deemed a "target of opportunity" by the U.S. Navy. ' 10l Id. The original plan called for attacking the R-7 Reshadat oil platform (there were three in the area, identified as R-3, R-4, and R-7). Id. The R-4 platform was that "target of opportunity" and was "severely damaged," while the R-7 platform was "almost completely destroyed." Id. Because of these attacks, Iran claimed that oil delivered a letter to the Security Council of the United Nations pursuant to U.N. Charter Article 51,102 stating that the United States had taken measures to exercise its inherent right of selfdefense under international law. In the Oil Platforms case, the United States argued that it had an inherent right of self-defense due to Iranian attacks on commercial shipping channels. 1°4 In response, the Court stated that the United States must show:
that attacks had been made upon [the United States] for which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of such a nature as to be qualified as 'armed attacks' within the meaning of that expression in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and as understood in customary law on the use of force. 10 5 In addition, the Court demanded that the United States show "that its actions were necessary and proportional to the armed attack made on it, and that the platforms were a legitimate military target open to attack in the exercise of self-defence."' 0 6 In sum, the ICJ required the United States to shoulder the burden of proving that an armed attack took place, that Iran was responsible, and that the steps the United States took in response were necessary and proportional to the provocation and taken upon legitimate military targets.
Evidence Surrounding the October 19, 1987 Attack
The Court ultimately held that the United States had not met production from these platforms could not be re-started for several years. Id. Concerning the U.S. claims about Iranian missiles, Iran argued that there were no operational missile sites located in the area where the missile launch supposedly occurred" 3 and that Iraq may have launched the missile in order to internationalize the conflict.
14 Iran responded to the testimony of the Kuwaiti security offers by pointing out that their testimony was over ten years old and that, in any event, it contained discrepancies between the English and Arabic texts of the statements provided to the ICJ. " 5 Based on the evidence presented by the United States and Iran, the Court determined that "a conflict of evidence" existed" 6 and, 107 Id. para. 61 (stating "[i]n short, the Court has examined with great care the evidence and arguments presented on each side, and finds that the evidence indicative of Iranian responsibility for the attack... is not sufficient to support the contentions of the United States").
108 
Evidence Surrounding the April 18, 1988 Attack
The Court then analyzed the April 18, 1988 attacks by the United States on two oil platforms," 9 noting the existence of linkages between certain actions by Iran and the United States' right to exercise self-defense. ° With respect to the Iranian Salman complex, two U.S. destroyers and a supply ship first warned Iranian personnel and then called in an attack from numerous ships, warplanes and helicopters. 12 Shortly thereafter, three warships and several helicopters destroyed the Nasr complex. 22 That same day, the U.N. Security Council received a letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the U.N. stating again, in a virtually identical recitation to its previous missive, that the United States was exercising its inherent right of self-defense "by taking defensive actions in response to an attack" by Iran. 123 This letter described how a mine had struck the Isle City; the evidence as to the nature of other missiles fired at Kuwaiti territory at this period is suggestive, but no more." Id. 
Necessity and Proportionality in Self-Defense
The ICJ then dealt with the criteria of necessity and proportionality as elements in international law relating to selfdefense. 3 5 The United States claimed that "[a] measure of discretion should be afforded to a party's good faith application of measures to protect its essential security interests" in determining whether an armed response in self-defense is in fact "necessary."' 136 The Court noted that Iran conceded certain U.S. security interests were reasonable, such as ensuring the safety of U.S. vessels and crew and ensuring the unimpeded flow of commercial shipping in the Gulf, but that Iran's concessions did not extend to the destruction of the oil platforms.
13 7 The ICJ also noted that the "necessity" requirement under international law was "strict and objective," excluding any room for discretion or a good faith defense by a party.' 38 The ICJ's holding in the Military and Paramilitary Activities case deeply informed the Court's analysis of the necessity and proportional criteria.' 39 A central component of these criteria is "the nature of the target of the force used avowedly in self- 133 Id. 134 Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned:
The Court does not exclude the possibility that the mining of a single military vessel might be sufficient to bring into play the 'inherent right of selfdefence' ... the Court is unable to hold that the attacks on the Salman and Nasr platforms have been shown to have been justifiably made in response to an ,armed attack' on the United States by Iran .... Id. 135 Summary of the Judgment of Nov. 6, 2003, supra note 8. 136 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 73. 137 Id. 138 Id. "The Court does not however have to decide whether the United States interpretation... is correct, since the requirement of international law that measures taken avowedly in self-defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving no room for any 'measure of discretion." ' Id. 139 Id. para. 74. 2 the Court stated that the necessary and proportional prongs for the self-defense exception to the use of force were "rule[s] well established in customary international law."' 4 3 Because the Court was not satisfied that the attacks on the platforms were necessary to respond to the incidents claimed by the United States, it felt that the U.S. claim of using self-defense actions in response to an Iranian armed attack was difficult to maintain. 144 The United States argued that the Iranian platforms constituted legitimate targets for military action and that Iran used the platforms as a military communications link and a staging area for attacks on neutral shipping.' 45 The United States attempted to show the military nature of the oil platform targets by producing expert analysis of the circumstances surrounding the attacks, documents found on the Reshadat complex and aboard the Iran Ajr vessel, and testimony by members of the international community allegedly aware of the oil platform's military use. 146 The Court conceded that the United States offered considerable evidence for the military nature of the Reshadat platform, but it questioned the adequacy of proof regarding the Nasr and Salman platforms.' 47 Iran, on the other hand, claimed that the military personnel and equipment on the platforms were merely defensive and necessary to repel possible future Iraqi attacks. 14 8 Additionally, Iran argued that the documents produced by the United States were 140 Id. 141 
Id.
142 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996-1 I.C.J. 226 Turning to the proportionality requirement, the Court held that the retaliation for the attack on the Sea Isle City was proportionate, but, since the attack was not "necessary," it was not a legal exercise of force. 54 The Court paused longer on the proportionality of the April 1988 attacks. It first examined whether destroying an oil platform was a proportionate response to mining a naval vessel. 55 Although not completely ruling out the possibility in future cases, the Court concluded that the U.S. bombing campaign in response to the mining of a single U.S. warship was a disproportionate use of self-defensive force under customary international law. 15 [T]he Court cannot assess in isolation the proportionality of that action to the attack to which it was said to be a response; ... the whole operation, which involved, inter alia, the destruction of two Iranian frigates and a number of other naval vessels and aircraft ... [ Iran contended that the U.S. attacks on the Reshadat, Nasr, and Salman oil platforms constituted a breach of U.S. treaty obligations.1 61 Iran claimed that since the U.S. attacks focused on commercial oil-producing facilities that would subsequently export oil to the United States, the attacks prevented the freedom of commerce between the two nations, in violation of the Treaty of Amity.
162
To evaluate Iran's claims, the Court first examined whether commerce did in fact exist between the two nations in relation to the particular oil platforms and then examined whether the U.S. attacks impeded that commerce. 
Commercial Aspects of the Oil Platforms
The Court first determined whether only oil exports between the United States and Iran were relevant to the proceedings. 164 At the preliminary objection stage, the Court noted that it was difficult to discern "if and to what extent the destruction of the Iranian oil platforms had an effect upon the export trade in Iranian oil." ' 165 In its pleadings, Iran sought to show that oil, whether produced, processed by, transported from, or stored on the platforms, was to some degree exported to the United States and, therefore, part of the stream of commerce between the two countries. 166 The United States, on the other hand, claimed that the platforms were not engaged in producing goods for export to the United States, and that its attacks did not destroy any oil that otherwise would have been shipped to the United States.
7
Since the U.S. attacks did not damage the platform's subsea lines used to transport oil for storage at nearby islands, the Court held that there was not "prima facie interference with the transport of goods mainly destined for export.'
' 16 8 Despite arguments by the United States that its attacks on commercial oil platforms were limited to the extent necessary so as to not breach the Treaty of Amity, the Court held that Article X(1) of the Treaty of Amity applied to the "protection of freedom of commerce... [and] the platforms attacked by the United States, and the attacks thus impeded Iran's freedom of commerce.'
16 ' An integral part of the Court's analysis, however, was whether the U.S. actions actually interfered with freedom of commerce between the two countries under the Treaty of Amity. 7°1 64 See id. para. 82. The United States also tried to question whether the oil platforms were even within the "territory" of Iran for the purpose of the Treaty of Amity, but the Court dismissed this argument as untenable. Id. 165 Preliminary Objection Judgment, supra note 2, paras. 50-5 1.
166 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 84; Iranian Pleadings, supra note 161, at 88-89. 167 Oil Platforms, supra note 2, para. 87. 168 Id. para. 88. 169 Id. para. 89.
170 See id. According to the Court decision, Article X(l) applied to the oil platforms as part of the freedom of commerce of that Treaty, but the real question for analysis was whether the attacks actually impeded the freedom of commerce between the two parties.
OIL PLATFORMS CASE & THE LCJ
U.S. Counter-Argument Against Commerce
The United States initially argued that the attacks did not affect commerce between the two nations. First, the United States claimed that the attack on the Reshadat platform did not affect commerce between the two countries because it occurred while the platform was under repair after an Iraqi attack, and thus, not producing oil. 71 Therefore, according to the United States, the platform was "not engaged in, or contributing to, commerce between the territories of the Parties."' 72 Second, the United States claimed that the attack on the Salman and Nasr platforms did not directly affect commerce between the contracting parties because the United States banned most Iranian imports after October 29, 1987.173 Executive Order 12,613 prohibited imports into the United States of almost all Iranian goods, including oil. 74 Thus, the United States reasoned that after the relevant date there was no actual commerce between the two nations.
1 75 In light of these facts, the ICJ acknowledged that Iran's arguments regarding continued commerce between the two parties appeared remote. 
Iran 's Argument Regarding Commerce
In response, Iran asserted that the Executive Order violated the Treaty of Amity and that the U.S. argument was circular. 77 In other words, Iran accused the United States of justifying its violation of the Treaty of Amity with a previous violation of the same treaty, the previous violation itself illegally impeding 171 See id. para. 90. 172 Id. Iran claimed that production would resume on Oct. 24, 1987 (five days after the attack), but the Court did not possess information about whether the repairs were on schedule. commerce. Since Iran did not formally put these questions regarding the legality of the embargo to the Court, the ICJ held that it had not heard full arguments on Iran's assertions.' 78 Accordingly, the Court only examined the actual effects of the embargo by the United States.
1 79
Iran next argued that the question of whether the embargo impeded actual commerce between the two states rested on whether indirect commerce continued after the Executive Order. 8°E ven after the Order, Iran sold oil to refineries and commercial interests in Western Europe and Asia, which, in turn, sold finished products to the United States. 8 ' Iran claimed that their oil still entered the United States through these commercial transactions and that some of the oil from the oil platforms in question could have entered this stream of commerce if the United States had not destroyed the platforms. 8 2 The Court rejected this argument, holding that the transactions were "not 'commerce' between Iran and the United States, but rather 'commerce' between Iran and an intermediate purchaser; and 'commerce' between an intermediate seller and the United States."' 18 3 The Court held that without an ongoing financial interest in the actual oil goods that were exchanged between the third party and the United States, the Iranian sale of oil to third party countries did not constitute commerce between Iran and the United States. 8 4 Thus, the Court 178 Id. Whether the embargo constituted a breach of the Treaty of Amity is an intriguing issue. A deeper investigation potentially leads one to believe that the U.S. actions were in breach of the Treaty of Amity, and one can only speculate upon the reasons why the Iranian government did not actually include that charge in its pleadings. It has been remarked that because the National Iranian Oil Company led the litigation in the ICJ, the Iranian government did not present a formal claim against the embargo in order to focus the litigation on the oil platforms damage, rather than the breach caused by the embargo. Interview with Allen S. Weiner, supra note 7. Some speculation has been made that Iran did not include the embargo as part of the ICJ case because they have chosen to argue this in the Case A/30 before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal instead. Id. [Vol. 30 rejected Iran's claim against the United States for breach of obligations under Article X(1) of the Treaty of Amity, and it also denied the Iranian claim for reparations for the oil platforms.' 85
E. Judging the U.S. Counterclaims
After denying Iran's claim for reparations, the Court then analyzed the counterclaim by the United States against the government of Iran.' 86 The United States alleged that Iran, through its military, impaired its freedom of commerce and freedom of navigation. 187 The Court first examined ten alleged attacks by Iran on U.S. vessels, starting on July 24, 1987 and ending on June 11, 1988.188 The Court held that none of the vessels that were attacked were "engaged in commerce or navigation 'between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties."" 89 Hence, the Court rejected the U.S. counterclaims regarding all of those attacks.
The Court next examined the generic claim made by the United States that Iran "made the Gulf unsafe" through an amalgamation of "attacks on United States and other vessels, laying mines and otherwise engaging in military actions in the Persian Gulf."' 9° To succeed on this claim, the Court held that the United States needed to demonstrate that Iran's actions created "an actual impediment" to commerce or navigation between the two countries.191 Because none of the specific incidents, nor the claim, actually involved interference with navigation or commerce under the Treaty of Amity, the Court denied the counterclaims of the United States. 1 92 It is intriguing that the ICJ did not engage in the same analysis of the U.S. counterclaims as it did with the earlier Iranian claims. Regarding the Iranian claim, the ICJ went straight to the Article X analysis.' 93 It did not do so with the U.S. counterclaim, however. 9 4 In addition, with the U.S. counterclaims, the Court did not conduct an Article XX(1) use of force analysis, but instead engaged in a very different mode of analysis than that used to decide the Iranian claims. 95 As will be discussed below, this Article alleges that the Court's analysis regarding the U.S. counterclaims differed precisely because of the Court's desire to comment on recent U.S. actions in other countries. 96 The differing treatment of the virtually identical claims made by the United States and Iran demonstrates that the ICJ's decision was partly political commentary, rather than a judgment deriving exclusively from principles of international law.
F. The Final Judgment
At the end of the fifty-five page decision, the sixteen judges of the ICJ voted on the specific claims of both the Iranian and U.S. governments. The judges denied the claims of each country. [
Additionally, by a fifteen to one vote, the Court rejected the counterclaim by the United States against Iran for breach of obligations of the Treaty of Amity and held that no reparations were due the United States either. 200 In Part V, this work will turn to the inconsistencies and problems with this judgment, suggesting a possible rationale behind the Court's unsettling decision.
V. The ICJ's Commentary on Current U.S. Actions and Further Examination of the Oil Platforms Case
The Oil Platforms decision represents an interesting case study regarding the role of exogenous political considerations in the analysis and decisions of the ICJ. Indeed, the analysis of this decision reveals that ICJ judges arguably played a political role in this controversy. This Article contends that the desire of the majority of the Court to comment on recent U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq colored the ICJ's decision. 0 ' In addition, the Court's failure to analyze either the "necessity" or "proportionality" prongs of the use of force in self-defense doctrine 20 2 raises legitimate questions regarding contributions of the ICJ to the development of a coherent, predictable set of international rules that are capable of truly governing the behavior of countries in the international arena. Rather than develop a coherent doctrinal justification for its decision, the Court succumbed to the temptation to "send a message" on the appropriate use of force to the United States and to comment on recent U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. 0 3
A. The Court's Decision on Article XX(1)(d) Defenses
The ICJ decision denied both Iran's claims against the United States and the U.S. claims against Iran for breach of Article X(1) of the Treaty of Amity. 0 4 Although the Court held in a fourteen to two judgment that the U.S. actions were justifiable measures necessary to protect essential security interests," 5 [Vol. 30 judgment on the Article XX(l)(d) issue was disconcerting and that the Court's reasoning and methodology on the issue was "problematic."21 ' Challenging these opinions, however, Judge Simma defended the Court, asserting that issues relating to the U.S. use of force "are at the heart of this case" and, thus, the approach the Court took was the proper one. 212 In addition, Judge Koroma wrote in his Declaration that the Court was bound to rule on the Article XX(l)(d) issue and that the principles that it used were consistent with general customary international law. 213 The arguments of Judges Burgenthal, Owada, and Higgins are logically sound, in contrast to the arguments of their colleagues on the Court. By any standard, "the protection of essential security interests" issue becomes irrelevant once the Court found no breach of Article X(l) by the United States.
There are several plausible explanations for why these judges expressed concern regarding the reasoning underlying the judgment, but still, nevertheless, voted overwhelmingly in favor of it. First, historically, there has been a strong push by the Presidents of the ICJ to fashion large majorities for the Court's judgments. 14 Even if judges disagree with certain aspects of a ruling, they are strongly encouraged to vote favorably if the outcome is agreeable.
2 15 This is thought to increase the legitimacy of the Court as an institution and to strengthen the force of the legal rules articulated by the Court. 216 Second, the majority of the judges in this case may well have desired to make a statement on the use of force doctrine in light of the recent events relating to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It is not likely any country will be able to challenge U.S. actions directly in the ICJ. Hence, the Oil Platforms case was one of the few opportunities for the ICJ to express its displeasure with the U.S. interpretation of the use of force doctrine. Indeed, ICJ holdings are not used as precedent in future Court cases, at least not in the way that U.S. lawyers understand the principle of stare decisis, but the Court's decisions do aid in the development of customary international law. 217 In this situation, the Court played an active role in defining the proper use of force by rebuking the United States for engaging in what many international legal scholars would likely consider a legally proper use of force, even while the Court denied Iran's claims.
Without looking at working drafts of the ICJ decision or being privy to their internal discussions, one can only speculate as to what the members of the Court thought while trying to craft the decision in Oil Platforms. 2 1 8 Nevertheless, at least five of the fourteen judges expressed some concern or reservations regarding the Court's reasoning. 219 This, coupled with the obvious incongruity of the Court's logic, suggests that the decision may well have been at least in part politically motivated. The fact that the Court did not actually need to decide the U.S. essential security interest defense gives credence to the theory that the rationale of Oil Platforms was not solely related to events in 1987 and 1988. Although a large majority concurred in the denial of 216 Id. 217 The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines its sources of international law in Article 38, which lists "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" as part of the international law it uses in making its decisions. ICI Statute, supra note 12, art. 38(l)(d). 218 One professor has speculated that it would be interesting to see these actual drafts in order to see how they were changed in order to get the judges to agree to a 14-2 opinion. Interview with Allen S. Weiner, supra note 7. Iran's claims and the U.S. defenses to those claims, over one-third of that majority took issue with major portions of the reasoning of the decision. 2
B. A Noted "Lack of Evidence " and Operational Concerns
The Court ruled that the evidence presented by the United States concerning the events leading up to its attack on the oil platforms was not sufficient to support the "essential security interest" argument. 21 Despite volumnious evidence regarding Iranian actions, mining activities, missile launches, and a threepage description of ten separate alleged attacks, the Court still concluded that the United States had not offered conclusive evidence of an Iranian attack.
2 2 The decision does not provide countries with a logical framework for protecting their "essential security interests." "Highly suggestive, but not conclusive, evidence"1 is something that lawyers might be able to parse with enough time and money, but it does not provide adequate guidance to the commander of a naval vessel or a military head. The Court's decision, while resolving the immediate dispute, makes little headway towards creating more defined terms and practicable precedents within international law.
This failing was not lost on a substantial number of the judges. 2 According to Judge Owada, there was an "asymmetry in the production of evidence" before the Court, especially since the U.S. actions were general public knowledge, whereas the alleged Iranian attacks were not. 5 Because of this asymmetry and the acknowledged difficulties in securing reliable evidence, Judge Owada urged the Court to further examine the evidence prior to holding on a use of force violation by the United States. 226 As a corrollary to this assertion of asymmetry in evidence, Judge Owada implored the Court to act as a fact-finder and to take a more proactive stance in the administration of justice. 227 In his separate opinion, Judge Buergenthal echoed Judge Owada's concerns, remarking on the Court's flawed application of the standards of evidence to the detriment of the United States. 228 These separate opinions exhibit a profound disquiet, yet both judges reaffirmed their support of the overall holding of Oil Platforms. The Oil Platforms decision can thus be seen, at least in part, as an occasion on the part of some of the judges to comment on recent U.S. actions, despite the fact that certain parts of the reasoning and the actual holding alarm a minority of the judges.
This case also makes clear, however, that the ICJ as an institution is not as well-equipped to deal with fact-intensive cases. The ICJ, as a court of both plenary first jurisdicition and final appellate jurisdiction, is well-suited to decide matters of law. 229 Without the institutions and evidentiary rules that characterize most national and state courts, however, the ICJ is not wellequipped to decide cases that involve large amounts of purely factual evidence. Indeed, this case suggests that the ICJ should work to develop stronger rules of evidence and mechanisms for resolving evidentiary issues. Both Judges Owada and Buergenthal give support to the contention that the Oil Platforms holding met the conditions prescribed by the provisions of Article XX, paragraph 1(d), including, as relevant, the rules of general international law on the use of force. This, I submit, the Court has not done. In order to do that, in my view, the Court would have had to go deeper into ascertaining the facts surrounding the case. . The Court's actions "leave the impression that the Court did not pay particular regard to the cumulative weight of evidence... [and] suggests that items of evidence were individually assessed and individually dismissed as insufficient to show attribution, without reference to cumulative weight." Id. Indeed, if one were to review closely the actual evidence placed before the Court in the written pleadings, one might come away wondering if one could ever prove lawful self-defense before the Court, as it appears that the justices are not willing to make even the smallest connections in the inevitable gaps in evidentiary proof. 235 ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 59.
Id
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C. The Court's Holding on the "Necessity'" and "Proportionality" Defenses
The Court's analysis of the "necessity" and "proportionality" prongs of the self-defense doctrine may be largely a device to allow some judges an opportunity to make policy pronouncements that are untethered to basic international legal principles. The opinion of the Court on these issues is highly conclusory, rather than specific. 236 The Court only asserts that these aspects of selfdefense are part of the rule of customary international law and that it is "not satisfied" that these requirements have been proven. 23 Rather than explaining the precise factors involved in deciding whether the two prongs are fulfilled, the Court simply asserts its conclusion with virtually no legal or factual analysis. 238 For a Court that is charged with aiding the development of international law, 239 it appears highly counterintuitive, indeed inappropriate, for the Court to fail to articulate the reasons for its holding on certain issues that are of extreme importance to the case and to the international community at large.
The Oil Platforms holding on the use of force claim is opaque, as the Court does not explain why it is not satisfied with the defenses presented by the United States. The use of force doctrine within international law is one of the most complicated and confusing legal doctrines states face, 24° and it is important for the Court to clarify that doctrine. If the Court evaluated the "necessity and proportionality" defenses in terms of the evidence offered in this case, the Court would have had to explain its precise reasons for not upholding the U.S. defense. To put it another way, if the Court's reasoning against the U.S. use of force defense was factually developed and legally sound, then the Court would have expanded on and published those reasons.
Legally sound reasoning would have considerably aided the international community in its understanding of the limits of self-defense. But the ICJ did not expand upon or publish its reasoning. [Vol. 30 reasoning and clarity in the ICJ decision on "necessity" and "proportionality" supports the view that the Court's holding was intended, at least in some measure, as a comment on the current U.S. use of force in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than on its actual use of force in 1987 and 1988.
D. Raising Questions About the ICJ and Its Role in the International Community
The Oil Platforms case raises questions about the current scope and future reach of the International Court of Justice. The lack of evidence and the procedural issues raised by several judges supports a conclusion that the Oil Platforms Court attempted to decide something relevant to the world scene but not within its immediate jurisdictional mandate. Several judges in the decision argue that the Court's holding extended beyond the original question the Court was asked to rule upon, 241 while other judges remarked that the Court stayed within its jurisdictional limits.
242
The split on this issue, even among the judges themselves, raises serious concerns for the international community. If the Oil Platforms Court is able to extend its jurisdiction on certain matters by unilaterally deeming them appropriate to the case at hand, it is only a matter of time before the Court extends the holdings of other cases. Such overreaching may considerably damage the Court's legitimacy and should be of great concern to all who value its role as an international law-making institution.
Overreaching by the ICJ may also raise concerns within the international community about other international tribunals. The Court's possible extension of the subject matter of the Oil Platforms claim is fuel for advocates arguing against the advisability of international tribunals. The Court's extension of the holding in this case may also increase anxiety in countries that usually support the rule of law and avail themselves of the jurisdiction of the ICJ and other international tribunals. Indeed, this concern over the extension of jurisdiction and subject matter is one of the arguments made by the United States for not supporting some international tribunals such as the International Criminal There is a legitimite concern that such tribunals will become more politically motivated instead of abiding by and advancing the rule of law.
Additionally, in terms of the fact-finding issue discussed above in Part V.B., the international community might also need to rethink what cases should be brought to the ICJ. If the cases are highly fact specific and turn largely on the resolution of complicated factual matters, rather than on questions of law, it might behoove parties to seek and develop other methods of adjudication. Several of the judges in the Oil Platforms case remarked on this phenomenon, opining that the ICJ should establish higher evidentiary standards and develop clearer evidentiary rules. 244 If the ICJ is to continue to hear contentious cases and act as a fact-finder of first instance for international disputes, the Court must improve its rules on evidence and presentation of facts. For the moment, however, parties should be aware of these limitations and should act accordingly. Indeed, the Court's legacy as a fact-finder should not be viewed as strongly as its legacy as a interpreter of treaties and arbitor of customary international law.
VI. Conclusion
The ICJ's decision in the Oil Platforms case raises many questions regarding the proper use of force in self-defense, the appropriate interpretation of certain treaty provisions, and the precise contours of the doctrine of self-defense. The holding itself denies both parties' claims and leaves each country without the reparations they sought. But, when one analyzes the decision more closely, a number of concerns with the Court's holding arise. The recent circumstances of the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq likely had a serious effect on the Court's decision. The "lack of evidence" noted by the Court bolsters the conclusion that the Court's holding in Oil Platforms may have been more politically, rather than legally, motivated. The Court's lack of explanation [Vol. 30 and reasoning for its ruling on the "necessity" and "proportionality" prongs of the U.S. self-defense claim also suggests that the Court might have been motivated to reprimand the United States for its current activities as opposed to its past actions that were before the Court.
Of course, as an impartial institution set up to adjudicate disputes between nations, the ICJ's position in the international community is constantly changing as it decides more cases and establishes its own jurisprudence. But the Oil Platforms case raises serious concerns about whether the Court is adequately equipped to undertake the role to which it appears to aspire. If the Court desires to expand its role, it must overhaul evidentiary rules and establish burden of proof requirements. The case also raises questions as to the proper role of the ICJ in determining certain international legal principles, such as the appropriate use of force doctrine and self-defense exceptions. In terms of explaining relevant rules on the appropriate use of force and self-defense, the Oil Platforms case does not offer much guidance for states or scholars. When viewed as a commentary on current U.S. actions involving use of force and a reprimand against the United States, the Oil Platforms case is highly instructive about how the ICJ views itself, its legacy, and its future.
